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CONDILIAC'S
MODERNIZATION
OF
RATIONALIST
LANGUAGE THEORY
Evidence, Propositions,
and a
Newtonian Linguistics
R. Christopher Coski

tienne Bonnot, abbe de Condillac (1714—1780) is best
known for his writings on thought and language in the
French Enlightenment. His works from the Essai sur
I'origine des connaissances humaines (1746) through his hogique (1780) treat
the interrelationship of human reason and speech. Condillac is
certainly not the only thinker to explore this relationship in the Age of
Enlightenment. Philosophers throughout the seventeenth arid
eighteenth centuries, from Descartes, the intellectuals of Port-Royal,
and Locke, through La Mettrie, Rousseau, and Herder, at the very least
touch upon it, and many of them explore it exhaustively. But
Condillac does not simply explore the relationship between thought
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and language. More specifically, he predicates the dependence of
analytical reasoning upon language—2L theory that would prove to be
his most important contribution to epistemological thinking in the
eighteenth century.' This dependence, for the abbe, can be summed
up thus: "I'art de raisonner se reduit a une langue bien faite."^ This
paper examines Condillac's consideration of that relationship of
dependence primarily as it is presented in his work fArt de raisonner
(1776) and as it pertains to what he refers to as the "evidence of
reason" and identical propositions. The Art de raisonner one of five
sections of the Cours d'Etudes pour finstruction du Prince de Parme.
Published finally in 1776, this work was composed during the period
of 1758—1767 while Condillac was tutor to the Prince of Parma,
grandson of Louis XV, While this study will focus heaAnly on shtArt
de raisonner, many concepts from other works, including the Essai sur
I'origine des connaissances humaines, the Art de Penser (also part of the Cours
dEtudes) and the Eogique will be included to clarify and expand on
notions expressed in the Art de raisonner.
The present discussion consists of three parts. The first examines
the concept of the evidence of reason in Condillac's thinking. The
second considers the structure of the identical proposition—a notion
central to Condillac's evidence of reason and one that he largely adopts
from his rationalist predecessors—along with some of its implications.
The third shows the parallel that exists between Condillac's interpreta
tion of basic Newtonian principles and the abbe's own cognitive theory
of language, creating, in effect, a "Newtonian" linguistics. The thesis
of this study is that the Newtonian spin of Condillac's cognitivelinguistic philosophy casts the traditional rationalist theory of proposi
tions in a more modern light, by incorporating it into a larger empirical

' In particular. La Mettrie, Maupertuis, and Rousseau as well as the article "Langage" (1765)
of the ^ngclopidie would be influenced by Condillac's theory, each claiming that human
thought depends either in part, or entirely upon the use of language. La Mettrie, L'Homme
wflr^««,AramVartanian,ed. (Princeton: PrincetonUniversityPress, 1960), 163; Pierre-Louis
Moreau de Maupertuis, BJJkxionsphilosophiqms sur foriffne des langses, in Ronald Grifflsley, ed.,
Sur tOriffne du langage (Geneve; Droa, 1971), 31—46; Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Discours sur
torigine de tinegadte (Paris: Flammarion, 1971), 198-99; Le Chevalier dejaucourt,"Langage,"
in UEncfclopedie (Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt Frommann, 1966), 9: 242-43.
^ Condillac, Oeuvres phibsephiques, Georges Le Roy, ed. (Paris: Presses Universitaires de
France, 1947-1951), 2:401.
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framework, and by grounding cognitive linguistics in the physical
structure of the material world.
The key topic of Condillac's Art de raisonner is the problem of
evidence—that which can he seen^ clearly as indisputable truth. In this
sense he inherits one of the major philosophical obsessions of the
previous century, emphasized in Descartes' Discoursde laMethode (1637),
Port-Royal's Lagique (1662), or Malehranche's Recherche de la ve'rite (1674).
As an empiricist and a sensualist, however, Condillac is often placed in
opposition with the rationalist underpinnings of these thinkers.'*
Chomsky, in fact, authored a hook entitled CartesianUnguistics^ positing
that the vast majority of the thinkers who deal with a theory of
language (including Dumarsais, Beauzee, the scholars of Port-Royal and
others) in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries base their theories
on rationalist—specifically Cartesian—principles. Interestingly enough,
it is a hook in which Condillac's name does not appear even once—the
absence implying that Condillac's theory of language is not a rationalist
one. However, the question is problematic, since others have pointed
out that it is difficult to see what makes a grammarian such as Dumar
sais or Beauzee a rationalist, rather than an empiricist,and that,in many
respects, Condillac is more of a rationalist than the rationalists.^
In spite of his own sensualist leanings, the "seeing" of truth
certainly does not consist entirely and exclusively of the physical
observation of things in the material world in Condillac's cognitive
philosophy. In the opening of the
Condillac describes
three types of evidence: the evidence of feeling, the evidence of fact,
and the evidence of reason.^ Of these, the abbe glosses over the first
two fairly quickly, only briefly defining them. The evidence of feeling,
for example, is simply our awareness that we experience sensations, or
' From the latin "evidentia" derived from "videre" meaning "to see."
•* Sylvain Auroux, "Empirisme et thtorie linguistique chez Condillac," in Jean Sgard, ed.,
Condillac et ksprobtemes da langage (Geneva: Slatkine, 1982), 177-98.
' Noam Chomsky,Cartesian Linguistics: A.Chester in the History ofRationahstThought (New York:
Harper and Rowe, 1966).
' Pierre Swiggers, "La Semiotique de Condillac, ou la pensee dans la pensee," in Sgard, ed.,
Condillac et lesprohkmes du langage^ 221-32. Swiggers also questions the validity of Chomsky's
book in this article, wondering specifically how Chomsky justifies the linking of grammatical
theory to the history of ideas. Nevertheless, it can be safely argued (whatever one wants to
say about particular details of Chomsky's book) that, posso modo, Chomsky gives a fair
assessment of the link between rationalist thought and language theory from Ae period.
' Condillac, CEuvresphilosophiques, 1: 620.
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the act of seeing within ourselves.® It is the basis of consciousness,
which makes the evidence of fact possible. The evidence of fact
consists of those ideas we acquire through observation—^be it personal
or based upon the report of others—^in this case, literally seeing the
world around us.^ But while the evidence of fact may be an essential
building block in all soUd empirically-based reasoning, Condillac does
not explore observation as an art. Though it may be a skill in itself,
Condillac, in the.Art de raisonner, takes observation and evidence of fact
as a given. Of far greater importance to him is the evidence of
reason—^perhaps not so surprising given the tide of the work itself—or
what might be considered as the technique of combining those building
blocks given us by observation into, new knowledge.'"
The quest for a technique for thinking had always been an
overriding concern for the rationalists as well. Descartes, whose
Discours de la methode, as the tide indicates, seeks to expose the author's
method of reasoning, specifically lays out four basic rules for thinking
properly. The Port-Royal Ijagique also emphasizes this—^its full title La
Ijogique, ou fart de penser, contenant outre les regies communes, plusieurs
observations nouvellespropres a former le jugement— also focuses on rules for
reasoning, and presents a list oflogical principles somewhat longer and
more detailed than that of Descartes. A similar list appears in Pascal's
De I'espritgeometrique et de I'art de persuader
A The problem of how
to reason—or how to see not objects of thought, but rather the
connections and associations between objects of thought— and arrive
at indisputable truth by logically configuring and reconfiguring the

® Condillac, 1:620. While Condillac employs the indefinite article, stating this is "a" thing of
which weare conscious through the evidence of feeling, it is in fact the only thing he attributes
to this form of evidence. It would not be going too far to see a vague parallel between
Condillac's evidence of feeling and Descartes's "I think therefore I am." In either case it is
a question of the first, most basic truth a person can know. The only difference is in the
manner in which that truth is discovered.
' Condillac, 1:620.
These concepts of the building blocks of knowledge and the combination of those building
blocks into new ideas are drawn from Locke's notions of simple and complex ideas. John
Locke,..4» Esscff Concermn^Human Understanding (London: Everyman: 1993), 46; also Locke,
91.
" Descartes, Discoursde lamithode (Paris: Editions des Grands Ecrivains choisis par I'Academie
Goncourt, 1987), 42—43. Antoine Amauld, and Pierre Nicole, IM ha^ue, Pierre Clair and
Francois Girbal, eds. (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France,1965), 307-08. Blaise Pascal,
De [Espritgiomitrique, in Oeuvres completes (Paris: Gallimard, 1954), 596-97.
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fruits of observation also constitutes the object of the abbe's
de
raisonner. But, instead of relying on long lists of rules as many of his
rationalist predecessors do, Condillac focuses on a single concept, the
evidence of reason. Yet this single concept is far from simple.
While he briefly but clearly defines his other two forms of
evidence, Condillac's basic definition of the evidence of reason is not,
in truth, a definition at all but rather a question that he attempts to
answer;
Mais a quoi peut-on s'assurer d'avoir I'evidence de raison? A
I'identite. Deux et deux font quatre, est une verite evidente
parce que cette proposition est, pour le fond, la meme que
celle-ci, deux et deux font deux et deux. EUes ne different I'une
de I'autre que par I'expression.^^
For the abbe, if we are to permit ourselves to see something in our
minds as certain and true, we must depend upon the existence of
relationships of identity. Such relationships are based on the character
of two objects of thought, or ideas, that, while existing separately and
distinctly, are exacdy the same." Condillac offers the mathematical
example of "two plus two equals four."" Obviously this statement is
true. The mind can—and indeed must—^give its complete consent to
this proposition. We all recognize that "two plus two" is the same
thing as "four." Mathematically speaking, the two expressions
represent the same idea. Since, as a matter of semantics, "four" can be
rephrased as "two plus two," the entire phrase can be rewritten as "two
plus two equals two plus two," thus creating complete confor
mity—^literally, the similarity in form—of the parts of the statement to
each other. Moreover, Condillac implies that there is not simply
similarity in form of the parts of the statement itself, but also similarity
between form and content, between each element of the proposition
and the reality that each element represents. In other words, he implies

Condillac, CEuvresphilosophiqms,1: 620.
" Or identical. From the Latin "identicus" from "idem," meaning "the same."
'* Indeed, Condillac sees mathematics as being the basis of all human reason. In a work left
uncompleted at his death, ha lanffie des calculs, Condillac attempts to demonstrate that the
algebraic model could (at least in theory) serve as a template for a perfected rational, logical
human language.
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that there is a link between the words "two plus two" and the reality of
the quantity of four, as well as between the word "four" and that same
reality. This is, in fact, the only way in which the exchange of forms
can legitimately be made.
The link, for the abbe, between the form of a word and the reality
it represents is apparent in as early a work as his Essai, in which he
explores at length the evolution of language, and determines that the
signs constituting institutional language have origins that naturally link
them to the reality they represent. This idea is maintained and even
more explicitly presented in later works such as the Grammaire, also part
of the Cours d'etudes, in which CondiUac stresses that institutional
linguistic signs are not arbitrary but are, instead, artificial, that while
they may be the creation of man, they are nevertheless grounded in
reality and have an inherent and natural link to the things and ideas they
represent.*^ In essence, for CondiUac, the institutional signs of human
language "are not, and indeed could not be, arbitrary in the sense of
their linking being totaUy without foundation."^® Thus the logical
proposition, for CondiUac, is not merely an enunciation of a relation of
identity between two terms, but the expression of a judgment of reaUty
or of values considered not only as form but just as importantly as
content, a content that is inherendy linked with formal linguistic
expression.
This connection between form and content is a concept closely
examined by many of CondiUac's precursors and contemporaries.
James Harris, in his Hermes (1751) for example, emphasizes the binary
relationship of matter and form, as does Monboddo, who, in his Ori§n
andProgress of Language (111'5—\l97), states thatlanguage consists oftwo
things—sounds and conceptions of the mind. Court de GebeUn, much
as Plato had done in Cratylus, takes this further in his Histoire naturelk de
la parole, where he explores the relationship between specific quaUties
of sounds and signification, and points out that it is in the speech
organs of man that we must seek the basis of human language,
specificaUy considering the function of each part of the speech-making

" CondiUac,
1: 429.
" Talbot Taylor."Free Will vs. Arbitrariness in the Linguistic Sign," in Hans-Josef Niederehe
and Konrad Koerner, eds., Histoiy and Historiogrc^hy of Linguistics: Papers from the Fourth
International Conference on the History of the Language Sciences (Philadelphia: Benjamins, 1990),
1:79-88.
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aparatus in man (lungs, trachea, vocal cords, and so on) in an endeavor
to connect them and the sounds they produce to meaning by way of a
sound-based, etymological archeology of signification,'^ So it is true
that the meaning of the word, for Condillac as well as for many of his
contemporaries, has truth in that, in one way or another—either
through the representation of man's perceptions of his environment or
else through a direct sound link with the physical world—^it is grounded
in reality.
But Condillac's examination of these matters takes on additional
complexity because he is not attempting merely to establish the
relationship between word and reality, but rather the connection
between a series of words—^a proposition—and reality, and thereby
establish how the mind knows that the whole of a statement is true.
This is the difficult point for Condillac. After all, according to the
abbe, the reason for which the mind recognizes the truth of the
statement imposed upon it, is that the proposition "two plus two equals
four" is, in terms of what it refers to, the equivalent of "two plus two
equals two plus two," and the mind knows this truth through a
relationship of identity. Still, this explanation does not answer the
question of just how such a relationship of identity can even be
considered to exist in the first place.
The solution to this problem is not readily apparent, since, as
previously mentioned, the definition of identity requires the sameness
of two separate and distinct things, and that is not easily discerned here.
First, it could be considered that these two propositions are the same
on the level of content or, as the abbe puts it, k fond—that which lies
beneath, or in the interior of the linguistic sign. To put it—admittedly
anachronistically—^in Saussurian terms, we might consider that the
signifieds of the signs in question are the same.'® Does this constitute

" James Harris, Hermes: Or a Philosophical Inquiry Concerning Universal Grammar (Menston,
England: Scolar, 1968), 309; Monboddo, Of the Otigfn and Progress of Language (Menston,
England: ScoUr, 1967),1:9; Coxsst Ac G&se^,Histoire naturelle de la parole (Paas: Plancher,
Eymery, Delaunay, 1816), 16-79; Plato, Craiplus, in Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns,
eds.. The Collected Dialogues of Plato (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971).
Anachronistic as it may seem at first, the parallel between Saussure and Condillac is surely
not very far off the mark. Aarsleff for example makes a very convincing argument that
Saussure was, in all probability, influenced by Condillac's ideas on language. See Hans
Aarsleff, "Condillac, Taine et Saussure," in Sgard, ed., Condillac et les probtemes du langage,
165-73.
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a relationship of identity? It cannot, since a relationship of identity
must occur between two separate and distinct things. The actual
quantity that is represented by the expression "two plus two" is not
separate and distinct from the quantity represented by the expression
"four." There is only one single signified here, not two separate and
distinct ones.
However, at the same time, identity cannot occur on the level of
the signifiers either. The two expressions are not similar in the
exteriorisation of the enunciation, that is, in the surface hnguistic
expression. Neither the actual sounds produced by the human mouth
in speaking the proposition, nor the actual typographical representation
of the signifiers themselves in the written production of these expres
sions, "two plus two" and "four," resemble each other in any way at
all.
Therefore, using Saussurian definitions as a framework for
interpreting Condillac, identity must occur on the level of the sign as a
whole. The sign is, in effect, simultaneously signifier and signified, or
even more precisely, the relationship between signifier and signified.
Hence the sign "two plus two" is the same as the sign "four" in terms
of its signified while at the same time being distinct and separate from
it in terms of its signifier. The identity exists between the two connections
or relationships of signifier to signified—between two connections or
relationships which are made up at once of form and meaning. In a
sense, Condillac intuits a primitive version of Saussurian semiotics
some one-and-a-half centuries ahead of its time. Condillac's concept
of identity is a coexistence of the linguistic and conceptual, a fusion of
form and of content; in a phrase, a matter of meaning. His principle
of identity, and therefore of rational thought, is semiotic by its very
nature.
The evidence of reason, then, is centered on the idea of the
identical proposition as a cognitive-linguistic structure. Interestingly
enough, the general notion of the proposition—as opposed to the
more precise concept of the identical proposition—^is not discussed in
the Art de raisonner. Of course, Condillac explores it elsewhere, first in
the Essai, and again in the Cours d'etudes, specifically in the Art depenser.
Unlike these works, the Art de raisonner is less about how to form
propositions than it is about how to use them. Yet, for the purposes
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of this study it is of interest to pause and look at the basic concept of
the proposition as Condillac describes it in other works.
In the Essai, the abbe first broaches the subject of propositions
while discussing the various operations of the human mind, beginning
with sensation itself, from which all ideas come to us, through the
global faculty of understanding, defined as the sum total of the fruits
of all human mental operations combined.'' Of all the operations
Condillac outlines, only the most primitive do not require language at
aU, and by the time one arrives at the stages of comparison, judgment
and reason, language is absolutely indispensable, since it is in these
operations that one must form propositions:
Quand nous comparons nos idees, la conscience que nous en
avons nous les fait connaitre comme etant les memes par les
endroits que nous les considerons, ce que nous manifestons
en liant ces idees par le mot est, ce qui s'appelle affirmer: ou
bien elle nous les fait connaitre comme n'etant pas les
memes, ce que nous manifestons en les separant par ces
mots, n'estpas, ce qui s'appelle nier. Cette double operation
•
20
est ce quIon nommejuger.
For Condillac, the role of the proposition is to permit the
examination of the ties and connections as well as the distinctions and
otherness between various objects presented to the mind through sense
perception. Sense perception of course does not require language, and
it generates what Condillac calls "conscience," the awareness pos
sessed by all sensitive beings of the environment surrounding them.
This conscience is an immediate, direct and spontaneous awareness of
the world, which enables the mind to have the ideas of real things
imprinted on it. It is also the basis of our knowledge of the connec
tions between things such that it marks them as being, in certain ways,
similar or different as we observe individual aspects of objects.

" CondiUac's complete list of mental faculties runs as follows: perception (sensation),
conscience, attention, reminiscence, imagirution, contemplation, memory, reflection,
abstraction, comparison, composition, decomposition, analysis, affirmation/negation,
judgment, reason, conception, understanding. According to the Erraf, only the first three do
not require the use of signs! Condillac, CEuvresphiloscphiques, 1: 8-28.
Condillac, CEuvresphihsophiques, 1: 27.
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However, conscience serves only as the basis for this latter
process—^it cannot perform the operation with precision and clarity on
its own. For the abbe, while language is not thought, it is only through
the proposition that man is capable of developing his ideas, analy2ing
the partial ideas of which they are composed as well as the links that
connect one idea to another.^' Indeed, CondiUac's statue in the Traite
des sensations (1754) does reason without the use of language^—but its
reasoning is limited to what the abbe calls connaissances pratiques, or
"practical knowledge,"involving nothing more than thought processes
resembling those of a man making his way home among the bustling
streets of Paris, dodging carts and horses, stepping over puddles,
avoiding obstacles in his path, making thousands of minor judgments
without ever reali2ing he is doing so. This however is not the same
order of reason or judgment implied by the connaissances de theorie, or
"theoretical knowledge," that constitutes the art of reasoning, the
sophisticated skill employed by an individual as he ponders religion,
philosophy or the weighty matters of politics.^ In terms of more
complex, conscious reasoning, the mind is only able to make its
comparisons evident through the use of the verb "to be." And this is
where the creation of propositions—^linguistic form shaping, or even
creating, thought—becomes absolutely essential for the philosopher of
Grenoble. The comparison of two ideas only becomes evident when
those ideas are clearly connected, when they are linked through a logical
relationship, a relationship simultaneously one of form and func
tion—again bringing us back to the notion of the sign and its compo
nent signifier and signified. It is alone the verb "to be" which makes
this assemblage of ideas possible for Condillac.
To an extent, Condillac again simply rehashes a very rationalist
notion of judgment by way of the structure of the logical proposition
set forth in the Grammaire (1660) and the Lngique of Port-Royal,
enabling us to see a good example of what is meant by Condillac
occasionally being more of a rationalist than the rationalists. Just as it

Jean-Claude Pariente, "Sur la Theorie du verbe chez Condillac," in Sgard, ed., Condillac tt
ItsprohUmes dtt langage, 257-74.
^ Condillac, CEuvresphihsophiqms,1; 261-68.
" For an excellent discussion of the distinction between non-linguisitic and linguistic
reasoning, see Andre Joly, "De la Theorie du langage a I'analyse d'une langue," inJean Sgard,
ed., Condillac et UsprobUmes du langage, 243-54.
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has been noted that, in terms of his Grammaire, Condillac can be placed
in the rationalist tradition of Port-Royal, and that Condillac builds his
grammar on foundations laid by rationalist grammarians,^'^ I would
point out that the same can be said with respect to Condillac's
considerations of reasoning and his model of logical propositions.
The Port-Royal Grammaire, for example, states that "Juger, c'est
affirmer qu'une chose que nous concevons, est telle, ou n'est pas telle.
Comme lors qu'ayant con9u ce que c'est que la terre, et ce que c'est que
rondeur, j'affirme de la terre qu'elle est rotide."^ The Grammaire adds
further that the primary use of the verb is to signify affirmation and
that even verbs other than "to be" are reducible to this same verb. For
example, 'Tierre vit" is actually an abbreviation of "Pierre est vivant"
or that "homo sum" can be reduced to "je suis homme."^
At first glance the distinction between Condillac's conception of
the proposition and that of the rationalists of Port-Royal is difficult to
perceive. One key point here, however, is that for the gentlemen of
Port-Royal the mind has previously conceived, on its own and without
the aid of language, the concepts involved and their connection to each
other. But the use of the copula "to be" for CondiUac is more than just
a means of connecting ideas already existing in the mind. It gives
reality to the existence of this idea of equality between subject and
attribute, between one idea and another—connection that the mind
otherwise could not conceive. The proposition is in essence the very
creator of identity, the creator of this new complex idea. For Condillac,
the mind does not know that two plus two is four until the thinker says
that two plus two is four. The spoken (or written) copula establishes
the equality of the two signs involved in the proposition. The two
signs do not, and cannot, exist in the mind as clear and precise notions
prior to linguistic enunciation.
Indeed, the mental operation of judgment itself consists solely of
affirming and denying for Condillac. These are both, by definition,
speech acts—acts of enunciation by which some operation—^in this
case, the assertion or the negation of a truth—^is performed through
verbalixation. This means that, for Condillac, the function by which
" Auroux, "Empirisme et theorie linguistique chez Condillac," 182-83.
^ Antoine Arnauld and Claude Lancelot, Gnmrnmn ginlraU et rmstmUe (Menston, England:
Scolar, 1969), 28.
^ Antoine Amauld and Qaude Lancelot, 91-92.

164

1650-1850

mental decisions regarding truth or falseness of intellectual content (or
for that matter, physical reality) are made is dependent upon the verbal
arithmetic of the proposition, in which the verb "to be" serves as the
equals sign. Thus "two plus two is four" becomes the basic structure
for any discovery of truth through reasoning, such as "the earth is
round" or "man is a thinking animal," where, in each case, an
equivalence is indicated between subject and attribute.^^
The role of the copula really is what defines the evidence of reason
since, as Condillac ultimately writes in ^cArtde raisonner, "I'identite est
done le signe auquel on reconn^t qu'une proposition est evidente par
eUe-meme; et on reconnait I'identite, lorsqu'une proposition peut se
traduire en des termes qui reviennent a ceux-ci, le meme est le memer^
Again the abbe returns to the idea that any logical proposition is true
only to the extent that it establishes an equivalence between two
separate and distinct concepts, and that the only manner in which one
can demonstrate such equivalence is by restating the proposition in
such a fashion that the equivalence becomes apparent on a semantic
level. Thus, in order for a proposition to pass the test of the evidence
of reason, it must be reducible to "this thing is equal to itself," or "A
equals A."
But there are obvious difficulties here. The problems relating to
what Condillac's predecessor, Locke, would have considered to be the
abuse of language such as loose definitions and factual errors can be
left aside.^' Condillac would simply argue that the evidence of fact
would take care of these anyway. However, if it is assumed that the
individual who is reasoning does have his facts straight, and that his
interlocutors are all defining their terms the same way, does there not

" While most thinkers of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries see the verb as the crucial
element in propositions and reasoning, not everyone agrees with this. Diderot, for example,
writes in 1751 that the adjective is the crucial element: "Qu'on vous demande ce que c'est
qu'un corps, vous repondrez que c'est urn substance etendue, mpenetrabk, figurie, calorie et mobile.
Mais otez de cette definition tous les adjectifs, que restera-t-il?..Lettn surles sourds etmuets,
in Norman Rudich and Jean Varloot, eds., "Premieres oeuvres (Paris: Editions Sociales, 1972),
2:95. Most thinkers, however, wotild argue that all of these adjectives would be useless had
man not the copula with which to attach them to the subject, and that in Diderot's own
example, "un corps est\me substance...."
^ Condillac, CEuvresphilosophiqms, 1: 621.
Locke, "Of Words," book III in An Ess<^ Concerning Human Understanding.
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remain the feeling that the identical proposition of "A equals A" is a
purely meaningless statement?
The idea that all true propositions are identical propositions
constitutes a significant portion of Derrida's larger inquiry in UArcheologie du frivole. Relevant to this present discussion is the fact that
Derrida indicates that underlying CondiUac's writing is the concern over
the frivolous in language, thinking, and philosophy. And indeed one
must wonder with Derrida whether such a proposition, which signifies
le mime est le mime, is not purely frivolous. As Derrida notes, CondiUac
organizes his discourse around the decision between the useful and the
fuldle, and that a philosophy of signs always threatens this decision.^"
This is a danger of which even CondiUac himself is keenly aware,
for in his Art depenserYvt asks if "les sciences humaines ne sont-eUes
done qu'un recueU de propositions frivoles?"'' CondiUac's response
to this question is, of course, that they can be if the nature of identity
is noisunderstood, but are not necessarily so, and gives the foUowing
example in the Art de penser. "un enfant qui apprend a compter, croit
faire une decouverte, la premiere fois qu'U remarque que deux et deux
font quatre. II ne se trompe pas; e'en est une pour lui. VoUa ce que
nous sommes."^^
CondiUac's distinction between the frivolous and the non-frivolous
is one of discovery versus banaUty. In essence, the distinction depends
upon the acquisition of new knowledge—and this newness is relative
to the individual who makes the acquisition. Obviously, counting to
four is not terribly extraordinary for an adult. However for a chUd, the
skiU of counting is brand new, and hence, for him, the reaUzation that
"two plus two" is the same as "four" is an exciting acquisition of truth.
Tomorrow, however, the chUd wiU not find this mathematical fact to
be an innovative revelation, but merely an ordinary and uninformative
truism. CondiUac sums up this relativity of frivoUty and utUity in the Art
de penser thus;
Par consequent, une proposition peut etre identique pour
vous et instructive pour moi. he blanc est blanc, est identique

'"Jacques Derrida, UArcheoloffe dufrivole (Paris: Galilee, 1990), 123.
" CondiUac, CEuvresphilosphiques, 1; 748.
" CondiUac, CEuvresphilosophiques,1: 748.
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pour tout le monde, et n'apprend rien a personne. hes trots
angles d'un triangle sont egaux a deux droits, ne peut etre identique
que pour un geometre.
Ce n'est done point en elle-meme, qu'il faut considerer
une proposition, pour determiner si elle est identique ou
instructive; mais c'est par rapport a I'esprit qui en juge."

So it is not that the merely identical proposition (one representing an
old truth) is frivolous while one bringing a new truth (and which is
therefore instructive) is not. For even an old truth can be instrumental
in leading to a new one. The very notion of the progress of the human
mind—that which CondiUac seeks to trace above all else from the
writing of his Essai through the end of his life—depends upon the
building of new discoveries on the foundation of old ones.
This idea is central to the definition of reason which Condillac
outlines in the Essai, stating that "de I'operation de juger nait celle de
raisonner. Le raisonnement n'est qu'un enchainement de jugements qui
dependent les uns des autres."^'' Again, this idea, taken in itself, is
similar to that expressed in the Port-Royal Grammaire that "Raisonner,
est se servir de deux jugements pour en faire un troisieme," or in the
Port-Royal Eogique-^\dsd!x defines reasoning as 'Taction de notre esprit,
par laqueUe il forme un jugement de plusieurs autres."^® The ability to
reason comes into existence through that action that consists of placing
together in a successive and intelligible order a series of affirmations or
negations between subjects and attributes. This act begins with the
known and proceeds always toward the unknown until a conclusion—
new truth—^is obtained. The knowledge of each new, successive truth
cannot exist without the prior truths.^® In turn, each new truth

Condillac, CEuvresphilosophiques, 1: 748—49.
^ Condillac, CEumsphilosophiques,1: 27.
Arnauld and Lancelot, 28; Arnauld and Nicole, "La Logique," 37.
^ Not all of Condillac's contemporaries believe that logical thought must be successive and
linear. Diderot writes that "la sensation [sensation being, for Diderot, as for Condillac, the
origin of ideas and thought] ria point dans I'ame ce developpement successif du discours; et
si elle pouvait commander a vingt bouches, chaque bouche disant son mot, toutes les
idees.. .seraient rendues a la fois" (2:120). Diderot emphasizes further that this is the natural
way of thinking for the mind—that the simultaneity of ideas, rather than the succession of
ideas, is essential to complex thought operations such as comparing, judging and reasoning
(2: 125).
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becomes an old one upon which the discovery of new ones is based.
Ultimately, for Condillac too, all of human knowledge is a balanced
and interconnected network of such identical propositions.
Still, two significant questions remain. The first is that of how the
empirical and sensualistic cognitive-Ungiaistic system of Condillac can
accommodate so many central principles of rationalist theories of the
mind. The second is the question raised earlier of how the proposition
as a whole corresponds to reality itself. An answer to both of these can
be found in an understanding of the relationship of CondiUac's
interpretation of the Newtonian model of the universe to his own
epistemological linguistics.
The link between Newtonian physics and the abbe's analytical art
appears as Condillac exposes his ideas on the practical application of
his principles of reasoning in Books II and III of the Art de raisonner.
Book III, specifically, is entitled "Comment I'evidence de fait et
I'evidence de raison demontrent le systeme de Newton." The title of
the third book is misleading. It could more appropriately be called
"How Newton's system demonstrates the evidence of reason." For
Condillac is not using this part of his work to prove Newton's theories
or to explore the evidence of fact. He is using an exploration of
Newton's theories to show how the thinking processes of a great mind
reflect his own conception of the proper method for reasoning
well—and to appropriate the basic priniciples of the great English
physicist to underpin his own system of thought.
Condillac begins this process, however, in Book II by dealing with
basic concepts of motion and mechanics such as one finds in simple
machines—^puUies, levers, inclined planes, and so forth—and other
mundane concerns based on those machines. These in turn, states
Condillac at the end of Book II, form the basis of Newton's system of
the cosmos, as "ce monde n'est qu'une machine semblable a celles que
nous venons d'etudier; c'est une. balance. Cette verite va vous etre
demontree par une suite de propositions identiques avec les proposi
tions de ce second livre."'^
The abbe then undertakes his consideration of the pertinence of
identical propositions to Newtonian physics. In the process Condillac
describes the history of the development of Newton's theories step by

" Condillac, CEuvresphilosaphiques,1: 657.
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step using identical propositions, accounting for various facets of
Newton's system including projectile movement, inertia, change of
motion, the elliptical trajectory of planets, center of gravity, and the
mutual gravitation of heavenly bodies. In the end, Newton's is a
system of physics that CondiUac interprets as follows:
Pour peu que vous reflechissiez sur la balance, la levier, la
roue, les poulies, le plan incline et le pendule, vous verrez que
ces machines et d'autres plus composees, se reduisent a une
seule, la balance ou le levier. L'identite en est sensible; elles
prennent differentes formes pour produire plus commodement des effets differents: mais dans le principe, toutes ne
sont qu'une meme machine.
Or notre univers n'est qu'une grande balance. Le soleil,
arrete au bras le plus court, est en equilibre avec les planetes
placees a differentes distances; et tons ces corps se meuvent
sur un point de suspension ou d'appui, qu'on nomme centre
commun de gravite; car point de suspension, point d'appui et
centre de gravite, sont au fond la meme chose.^®
All of mechanics and the physical sciences are reduced by Con
diUac to a single principle of the most simple mechanical device, the
lever, which CondiUac also (more than once) refers to as the "balance."
The balance itself, however, is not simply a lever, but rather a special
kind of lever with which objects of the same mass are placed in
equilibrium (generaUy to determine the mass of one of the objects).
WhUe both the balance and the lever employ a simUar structure
(consisting of a rod or a plane, and a fulcrum), levers are, in general,
used to create inequality of force or mass by providing a mechanical
advantage. The balance is not therefore a typical lever, by virtue of the
fact that it produces equality of force or mass on both sides of the
fulcrum. Hence it is not accidental that CondiUac specificaUy under
lines the balance and not simply the lever as the heart of Newtonian
physics. And this is why CondUlac's reference to the operation of the
universe specificaUy as a balance-style lever is so crucial. By interpret-

" CondiUac, CEupres phihsophiques, 1: 676. It would be interesting to see a study on how
CondiUac's interpretation of Newton's theories correspond to the original.
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ing Newton's concept of the structure of the universe in this manner,
CondiUac implies that all motion-producing forces are reducible to the
status of identity—of total equivalence—among themselves, in the
same way that all subjects and attributes are reducible, in true proposi
tions, to identity and eqiaivalence with each other. For CondiUac, this
reducibiUty is true not only of propositions, but of everything in the
entire universe, as he claims that the whole of the cosmos is nothing
more than an enormous balance, a network of equal quantities, equal
forces, equal motions, shifting about their fulcrums or centers of
gravity Uke mathematical phrases turning about an equals sign, or
Unguistic phrases revolving around the verb "to be."
For CondiUac, the process of reasoning in the human mind itself
is modeled by nature, and language—through its identical proposi
tions—simply foUows this model. In this respect, one can therefore
define CondiUac as the father of a Newtonian linguistic theory.
Newtonian physics centers on equal and opposite reactions—the
CondUlacian cognitive theory of language centers on logical proposi
tions, with equal elements on opposite sides of the copula, the fulcrum
or center of gravity of grammar and logic.
This last point answers the question regarding the connection
between the structure of the proposition and reaUty. By taking the
stance that the identical proposition mimics the structure of the
universe, CondiUac conflates various meanings of the classical term
logos. Not only is it for him, as for many others, the distinguishing
feature of man, combining thought and speech, but it is also the reason
that gives order, equiUbrium, and harmony to the universe itself. There
is finaUy but one logos for CondiUac, one natural order of the universe,
one natural order of language and thought, aU of which is the same
order, reducible to one single mechanical structure, such that, in the
end, le mem est le meme.
At the same time, this point generates an answer to the question
of the distinction between CondiUac's empirical theory of language and
the rationaUst language theory For it must be said that the idea of a
natural order imprinting language is not new at aU. The rationaUsts
typicaUy hold that God is the creator of the natural order, and that the
soul, the thinkmg element in man, is imbued by God with that order,
as is the universe as a whole, making our knowledge of truth possible.
Many rationaUst thinkers adapt this concept to a theory of language.
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Lamy (1675), for example, accepts the natural order concept and claims
that the natural order determines our thoughts and in turn the order of
words. Similar ideas are expressed by Dumarsais (1754), as well as by
Beauzee and Douchet (1757—1765) in the Engchpedie?^
However, this is precisely why Condillac's appropriation of
Newtonian physics is so crucial. For while the rationalists base their
natural order on the existence and benevolence of God, Condillac
adopts the mechanical order of the universe defined in Newton's
theories, a mechanical order that—^while certainly not by any stretch of
the imagination denying the existence of God—^makes God unneces
sary.
As a concluding remark, it can be said that in reality the two
questions resolved by Condillac's appropriation of Newtonian
principles are really one and the same question. How does the human
mind understand the universe? This is one of the most fundamental
questions to be asked by eighteenth-century thinkers on the topics of
language and cognition. Many Enlightenment philosophers, vehe
mently opposed to rationalism, embrace wholeheartedly the Cartesian
method of reasoning adopted and adapted by Port-Royal and others in
the seventeenth century. The technique is viewed by thephilosophes as
being basically sound. If Condillac is acknowledged, even praised, by
a Rousseau, a Voltaire, or a Diderot, for "correcting" the errors of the
rationalists, it is not because his theoretical method of reasoning is
fundamentally different from theirs. The abbe merely transplants the
old method in fresh soil. The crux of the matter is, for Condillac, one
of reinventing the mind and of reinventing the natural order concept,
and placing them in a modern empirical context more palatable to the
philosophes. What is essential is that Condillac removes the theory of
thought and language based on the natural order from its traditional
place in theology and abstract metaphysics and reframes it in the world
of the mechanical, physical sciences. In the last analysis, the human
mind, for the abbe, becomes yet another machine, operating on the

Bernard Lamy, The Art of Speaking in John T. Harwood, ed., The Rhetorics of Thomas Hobhes
and Bernard Lcsn^ (Carbondale and Edwards ville: Southern Illinois University Press, 1986),
182; Dumarsais, "Construction," in URngclopidie (Stuttgart-Bad Camistatt; Frommann,
1966), 4; 73-93; Nicolas Beauzee andJacques-Philippe-Augustin Douchet,"Grammaire," in
VEneychpidie, 7:841-47; "Inversion," in L'Bnydopidie,8:852-62; "Langue," inUEnyclepidie,
9: 249-66.
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same principle as—or on an identical principle to—every other
mechanism in a clockwork universe.

